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CONTRACTS
CHARI.-S H. RANDALL, J '.*
In Gainey v. Coker's Pedigreed Seed Co., 227 S.C. 200, 87 S.E. 2d
486 (1955), the Supreme Court held that the remedy of compensa-
tion afforded by the South Carolina Workmen's Compensation Law1
is exclusive, and that therefore an agreement to forbear presenting
a claim for compensation under that Law is not a valid consideration
to support a contract to recompense an employee for an injury. The
complaint asking damages for breach of contract alleged that plain-
tiff suffered injuries in early 1947 while in the employ of defendant,
and as a result thereof was entitled to payment of compensation un-
der the Workmen's Compensation Law. Agents of the defendant
thereafter induced plaintiff to forbear presenting his claim for com-
pensation, and promised him in lieu of such benefits that he would
be retained in the employ of defendant at his then salary, $195 per
month, until he reached sixty-five years of age or died. Plaintiff
did not make a claim for compensation, and the one-year period of
limitations set by the Law expired.2 On September 1, 1951, defen-
dant refused to provide plaintiff with further work, thus allegedly
breaching the contract. Damages in the amount of $20,000 were
asked.8
Defendant demurred to the complaint, stating as grounds that the
court had no jurisdiction in that the Workmen's Compensation
Law gives exclusive jurisdiction to the South Carolina Industrial
Commission.4 J. Woodrow Lewis, Circuit Judge, overruled the
demurrer, stating,5 "I find that the plaintiff is not bringing an ac-
tion for injuries sustained, but bases his consideration for the con-
tract of employment upon his forbearance to file a claim. There is
°Associate Professor of Law, University of South Carolina.
1. CODE OF LAWS o SOUTH CAROLINA, 1952 §§ 72-1 to 72-504.
2. CODE OF LAws OF SOUTH CAROLINA, 1952 § 72-303 provides:
The right to compensation under this Title shall be forever barred unless
a claim is filed with the Commission within one year after the accident,
and, if death results from the accident, unless a claim be filed with the
Commission within one year thereafter.
3. CODE OF LAWS or SOUTH CAROLINA, 1952 § 72-151 et seq. set out amounts
of compensation payable under the Law; § 72-160 provides: "The total com-
pensation payable under this Title shall in no case exceed eight thousand
dollars." Lump-sum payment is unusual, § 72-181; the usual method of com-
pensation is a weekly sum not exceeding $35 or 60% of the worker's regular
weekly wages. In cases of total disability, payment continues during disability
for a maximum of 500 weeks. § 72-151 as amended.
4. 227 S.C. 202, 87 S.E. 2d 488; Transcript of Record, pp. 5-6.
5. 227 S.C. 203, 87 S.E. 2d 488; Transcript of Record, pp. 6-7.
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no question raised as to the principle that forbearance to sue is valid
consideration for a contract." The Supreme Court, in an opinign
by Chief Justice Baker, reversed, holding that to enforce the contract
would violate the terms and the policy of the Workmen's Compensa-
tion Law.
After brushing aside objection to the form of the demurrer,6 the
opinion disposes of the possibility that to deny recovery on the con-
tract would be to entirely deny justice to the plaintiff, because the
Statute of Limitations had run on any right to make a claim before
the Industrial Commission under the Act. The court pointed out,
citing Young v. Sonoco Products Company, 210 S.C. 146, 41 S.E. 2d
860 (1947), that if the conduct of defendant's agents was such as
to mislead or deceive claimant, whether intentionally or not, and in-
duced him to withhold or postpone filing his claim until more than a
year had elapsed, that the defendant may then be estopped from pre-
senting the statutory limitation as a defense. The Chief Justice next
moved persuasively to a consideration of the legislative intent as
evinced by the terms of the Law, and concluded that to permit re-
covery would defeat the statute, saying, "The contract is not enforce-
able since neither the employer nor employee had the right to enter
into an agreement which evaded or avoided the terms and conditions
of the Compensation Act."7  The decision is eminently sound.8
6. Discussed below in footnote 8.
7. 227 S.C. 206, 87 S.E. 2d 489. The Court did not cite cases from other
jurisdictions cited by counsel. Accord with the instant case, and cited by
defendant, Woolsey v. Panhandle, 131 Tex. 449, 116 S.W. 2d 675 (1938) ; Bair
v. Susquehanna Collieries, 335 Pa. 266, 6 A. 2d 779 (1939). Contra, cited by
plaintiff. Oklahoma Portland Cement Co. v. Pollick, 181 Okla. 266, 73 P. 2d
427 (1937).
8. I would say that technically Judge Lewis was correct in the Court below
in his assertion that the demurrer did not raise these questions. CODE oI LAWS
OF SOUTH CAROLINA, 19'2 §§ 10-642, 10-643 are applicable. If I may re-
state Judge Lewis' position without doing him injustice, he felt that the de-
murrer raised only an objection to the jurisdiction of the court over the subject
matter of the action; to raise the question of forbearance to sue, the demurrer
should have stated that the complaint failed to state facts sufficient to consti-
tute a cause of action. The court is asked to take jurisdiction of an alleged
cause of action in contract, not of a claim under the Workmen's Compensa-
tion Law; of course it has jurisdiction of contract actions. The decision of
the Supreme Court, properly stated, is that no cause of action in contract
exists, the legislature having by statute forbidden it. This problem is one
which arises seldom in State practice, but fairly often in Federal practice.
The Fair v. Kohler Die & Specialty Co., 228 U.S. 22 (1913); Bell v. Hood,
327 U.S. 678 (1946); MOORE, COMMENTARY ON THE U. S. JUDICIAL CODE
(1949), p. 144. However, it would seem that the Chief Justice's liberal read-
ing of the demurrer is in the instant case preferable to the technical reading
by Judge Lewis. If the demurrer were over-ruled on this narrow ground,
the defendant could raise the question of failure to state a cause of action at
any time before judgment. Thus a saving of time and effort results from an
earlier decision on the merits. Further, it is obvious that the defendant takes
the position that the Workmen's Compensation Law provides the exclusive
remedy; the plaintiff's attack on the demurrer was dilatory.
[Vol. 9
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Ordinarily, forbearance to sue is sufficient consideration to support
a contract,9 but this rule must give way where it would defeat a clear-
ly expressed legislative intent.
Green v. Camlin, 229 S.C. 129, 92 S.E. 2d 125 (1956), involved an
alleged breach of contract for failure to deliver a franchise. Defendant
Camlin, doing business as Camlin Motors, had entered an agreement
in 1947 with Tucker Corporation, a Delaware corporation formed to
manufacture automobiles, whereby Camlin was given an exclusive
agency to sell Tucker autos in Georgetown and Conway, South Caro-
lina. This agreement provided, among other terms, that it was as-
signable only with the written consent of Tucker Corporation. On
September 15, 1948, for a consideration of $2,500, plaintiff John
Green agreed to buy from Camlin his right to sell Tucker automobiles
in Conway, and on such date he paid to Camlin $1,250 and received
a receipt which acknowledged "cash payment on the Tucker franchaise
[sic] for Conway." The balance was paid on October 6, 1948, and
a receipt then issued to plaintiffs John and Walter Green which stated
that "Balance of $1,250.00 on Tucker franchise paid in full for fran-
chise in Conway, S. C. . . ." Subsequently thereto, the plaintiffs
filed their application for the Conway franchise with Darling Motors,
Inc., of Charlotte, N. C., the Tucker distributor for North and South
Carolina, and the application was forwarded to the Tucker Corpora-
tion. Necessary financial statements and other papers were com-
pleted by the Greens and filed with the distributor, who approved
them and sent them on to Tucker for its approval. Camlin relin-
quished his selling rights to Tucker automobiles in Conway, but no
franchise was ever issued by Tucker Corporation to the Greens, nor
did Tucker Corporation ever approve in writing of the assignment.
Tucker Corporation was thereafter declared bankrupt and its assets
taken over by a receiver, and all its records frozen.
Plaintiffs sued for a return of the purchase price on the theory
that since no franchise had been delivered, the contract had been
breached. The Supreme Court so held, Mr. justice Moss saying :1o
It is apparent from the receipts above quoted that the parties
contemplated the contract to be completed when the respon-
dents received the right to sell Tucker automobiles in Conway,
South Carolina. He was aware that no part of his agreement
with Tucker Corporation could be assigned without the written
9. Counsel cited Hutton v. Edgerton & Richards, 6 S.C. 485 (1875) for this
fundamental proposition. Respondent's brief, p. 3.
10. 92 S.E. 2d 127.
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consent of Tucker Corporation. This written consent was never
obtained and hence the respondents never received the right or
franchise to sell Tucker automobiles in Conway, South Carolina.
The failure to obtain the sales agency or franchise right to sell
Tucker automobiles at Conway, South Carolina, constituted a
breach of the contract between the appellant and respondents and
entitled the respondents to recover the consideration paid there-
for.
The court further pointed out that the sales agency involved a rela-
tionship of personal credit and confidence, and hence was not assign-
able without the consent of the Corporation.
The decision would appear to be sound. All parties appeared to
have acted in good faith throughout the contract negotiations and
thereafter. The subject of the contract failed; the only question
was as to who would be left holding the empty bag. The contract
was one for the sale of a franchise; hence the question was, who had
an enforceable franchise when the company went bust? The as-
signee would have had an enforceable franchise only if, first, he
had received from Tucker Corporation a duly executed franchise;
or, second, if Tucker, pursuant to the franchise agreement with Cam-
lin, had sent the latter written consent to assign to Green. Neither
of these events having occurred, the Greens had no enforceable fran-
chise.
Turner v. Carey, 227 S.C. 298, 87 S.E. 2d 871 (1955), involved
an unusual application of the principle that when a seller makes
fraudulent misrepresentations in inducing a buyer to purchase proper-
ty, the buyer has an election of remedies: he may affirm the trans-
action, retain the property and bring an action at law for damages
for fraud and deceit, or he may rescind the sale and recover the pur-
chase price." Carey sold to Turner a house and lot near Spartan-
burg, for $11,000, allegedly making false representations as to the
condition of the house. Turner assumed a mortgage for $6,000 held
by Citizens and Southern National Bank (Bank's mortgage), gave
a second mortgage to Carey for $2,000 (Carey mortgage) and paid
11. PROSSER, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF Ton'ts (1941), 701-719. The author
lists eiglot possible options open to the party to whom a misrepresentation is
made: (1) a tort action of deceit; (2) a tort action for negligent misrepre-
sentation; (3) a contract action for breach of warranty; (4) a suit in equity
for relief, as by way of rescission; (5) a restitution action at law; (6) raising
the defense of misrepresentation to an action by the seller for the balance of
the purchase price, on the theory of rescission of the sale; (7) raising the
defense of misrepresentation in a similar action on the theory of affirmance
of the sale and recoupment; (8) in some situations, an estoppel.
[Vol., 9
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the balance of $3,000 in cash. Turner entered into possession, later
discovered the alleged defects and complained to Carey, who did not
remedy the defects to Turner's satisfaction. Thereupon, on advice
of counsel, Turner ceased making payments on both mortgages, and
in January, 1950, he began the instant action against Carey. The
complaint stated this action in terms of rescission, asking that plain-
tiff recover all amounts paid on the purchase price plus expenditures
made on the premises and punitive damages. Plaintiff declared that
he was ready and willing to reconvey the premises to Carey, and
asked also that the Carey mortgage be cancelled, and that he be re-
lieved of his assumption of the Bank's mortgage.
In May, 1950, the Bank brought an action to foreclose its mort-
gage, making both Turner and Carey parties defendant. Carey
answered setting up his mortgage and asking that it too be foreclosed
and judgment be given against Turner for the amount due.12 A de-
cree of foreclosure was entered, to which all parties consented, and
the property was sold. Carey in this decree was awarded judgment
against Turner for $1,117.40, representing the balance of his unpaid
mortgage plus interest and attorney's fees. The foreclosure sale, bid
in by Carey's son, brought only enough to satisfy the Bank's mort-
gage, costs and taxes. Carey thus at this point held a deficiency
judgment for $1,117.40.
The Turne'r action was then tried, and resulted in a judgment for
Turner for $4,265. On the damages question, the trial Judge, Circuit
judge J. Woodrow Lewis, charged the jury as follows :13
The measure of actual damages would be the difference between
the value of the house as it actually was and the value it would
have been had it been constructed as represented. The differ-
ence between those two values, if any, would be the amount of
actual damages that the plaintiff would be entitled to recover.
The charge to the jury made no mention of the deficiency judgment
held by Carey. At the conclusion of the charge, the jury was tem-
porarily excused as required, 14 and counsel given opportunity to ex-
press objection to the charge, or to ask further instructions. No such
requests were made. The jury thereupon entered its verdict for $4,-
265. Counsel for Turner then asked the court to inquire of the jury
whether it had taken into consideration in its verdict the outstanding
12. A motion to consolidate the foreclosure action with the rescission action
was denied.
13. 87 S.E. 2d 873.
14. CODa OF LAWS OF SOUTH CAaOLI-,qA, 1952, as amended, § 10-1210, Cumu-
lative Supplement.
.19561
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deficiency judgment. This the court denied, but upon further motion
of counsel it ordered that the verdict "vitiated" the whole transac-
tion of sale of the house, and that therefore the deficiency judgment
was void. This determination by the trial Judge was reversed by
the Supreme Court, in an opinion by Mr. Justice Oxner. The court
held that although the complaint stated a cause of action on the theory
of rescission, the case was tried on the theory of deceit, apparently be-
cause, at the time of the trial, the property had been sold in the fore-
closure sale, and hence could no longer be returned to the seller. The
court pointed out that the instructions to the jury on actual damages,
quoted above, clearly indicate that the jury was instructed as for an
action in fraud and deceit. An action based on fraud and deceit is
an affirmation of the contract, and hence the court correctly held that
the deficiency judgment was still in force.
Two contract cases were decided during the year by the United
States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, on appeals from Dis-
trict Court decisions in South Carolina. Jurisdiction in each was
based on diversity. In Julius Kayser & Co. v. Textron, Inc., 228
F. 2d 783 (4th Cir., 1956),15 the question was whether the parties
had reached a binding contract, or were still in the negotiation stage
and did not intend to be bound until they had executed a formal writ-
ten instrument. Kayser held a lease for 15 years on a new plant at
Liberty, South Carolina, and entered negotiations to assign its lease
to Textron. The parties reached agreement on the amount of rent
to be paid, and agreed that the assignment would be effective on April
1, 1954, at which date rent would commence. These terms were
reached at a meeting held in New York between Raymond C.
Kramer, Chairman of the Board of Kayser, and Royal Little, Chair-
man of Textron's Board of Directors. A "memorandum of purport-
ed agreement" was sent by Kramer to South Carolina counsel, con-
taining among other terms the provision, "Textron is to have the
right to earlier occupancy than April 1st by paying Kayser a pro
rata part of the total annual lease and taxes for any month or frac-
tion thereof." However, Kramer understood the term "earlier
occupancy" to mean occupancy for any purpose, including re-wiring,
installation of machinery or alterations; while Little understood that
it meant only occupancy for actual manufacturing operations. In
oral negotiations prior thereto the negotiating officials had used the
words "use" and "operations" with the same confusion of meaning.
Later discussions conducted by counsel with the parties failed to
15. Affirming 132 F. Supp. 49 (W.D. S.C. 1955).
[Vol. 9
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resolve this ambiguity. When the Kayser meaning of "earlier oc-
cupancy" was made clear to Little in a later draft of the agreement,
Textron refused to accept this term of the assignment, and thereafter
decided to abandon the project. The case was tried before Chief
Judge Wyche, without a jury. Judge Wyche found that the parties
had a misunderstanding and mutual disagreement as to the meaning
of the term "earlier occupancy." He held that this term was one to
which different meanings could reasonably be given, that this con-
stituted a lack of agreement on a material term of the contract, and
that therefore no enforceable contract had been made.1 6 The de-
cision was affirmed by the Fourth Circuit in an opinion by District
Judge R. Dorsey Watkins.
17
Southern States Life Insurance Co. v. Foster, 229 F. 2d 77 (4th
Cir., 1956), involved the provision of the South Carolina Statute
of Frauds relating to an "agreement that is not to be performed with-
in the space of one year from the making thereof."' 8 Plaintiffs J. W.
and S. V. Foster had written insurance agency contracts with the
Southern States company which provided that their compensation
would vary above or below the normal commission of 25% of premi-
ums paid, according to the claim loss experience, reviewed each month
by the company, on the policies plaintiffs wrote. Should they be dis-
charged without cause, plaintiffs under the contracts would be en-
titled to receive one-half of their renewal commissions for five years.
Plaintiffs were discharged without cause, which the company had a
right to do under the contract, and the company thereupon allegedly
entered a new contract, orally, with plaintiffs, whereby they were to
receive only one-half of the regular commission for five years, but
without any diminution or increase for claim loss experience. 19 From
September 4, 1952, when the contracts were terminated, through
16. 132 F. Supp. 52 to 56.
17. Both courts treated the question, without discussion, as one of South
Carolina law of contracts. This approach would seem to violate Klaxon Co.
v. Stentor Electric Co., 313 U.S. 487 (1941). The important negotiations for
the agreement took place in New York, especially since the Trial Court found
as a fact that the South Carolina attorneys did not have authority to renegotiate
items or terms. 132 F. Supp. 52, Findings of Fact, No. 2. Hence, the Federal
Court in South Carolina under the Klaxon rule should look to South Caro-
lina conflicts of law to see what law would govern. It may be that the con-
tract stipulated that South Carolina law would govern; it is doubtful that the
result would have been different in any event, since the question is one on
which the governing principles are generally agreed upon among common law
jurisdictions.
18. CODX oF LAws oF SOUTH CAROLINA, 1952 § 11-101 (5).
19. The consideration passing from the plaintiffs would, of course, be the
surrender of the right to added commissions where claim loss experience was
less than the normal.
1956]
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August, 1953, the company paid plaintiffs the half-commissions with-
out deducting or adding any amounts for claim loss experience. In
September, 1953, the company discontinued payments, stating that
on reckoning the claim loss experience of plaintiffs' assureds, it found
that it had overpaid plaintiffs. On the company's denying the validi-
ty of the alleged new agreement, plaintiffs sued for damages, claim-
ing breach of contract of the new agreement. The Fourth Circuit,
reversing Judge Timmerman in the District Court, held, first, that
the monthly checks to plaintiffs and the unsigned supporting state-
ments of account which had accompanied them, lacking as they did
any terms of an agreement as alleged, could not be considered such
a memorandum in writing as the Statute required; and second, that
the doctrine of part performance could not avail the plaintiffs to re-
move the bar of the Statute of Frauds. That the checks and accom-
panying data did not satisfy the statutory requirement of a memo-
randum in writing seems apparent. The case illustrates the limited
extent to which the part performance doctrine applies to contracts
not to be performed within one year. In the first place, even in land
contracts, the part performance doctrine has been held applicable on-
ly where plaintiff seeks equitable relief, and not where he seeks
damages at law.20 This rule applies also to contracts not to be per-
formed within a year.21 In the second place, the facts must be such
that the court feels that it would be a "virtual fraud" for defendant
to deny performance. 22 As pointed out in the instant case,28 the facts
did not meet that requirement.24
20. White v. McKnight, 146 S.C. 59, 143 S.E. 552, 59 A.L.R. 1297 (1928).
21. CoRxwN ON CONTRACTS, Vol. 2, § 459 (1950).
22. 229 F. 2d 81.
23. Id.
24. As the Court said, 229 F. 2d 79, plaintiff pitched his cause solely on the
new agreement. If he had argued that the old agreement was still in full
effect, but modified by the new agreement, the result would have been the
same. WLLIST N ON CONTRACTS, §§ 591 to 599, esp. § 593.
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